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MAYDAY, MAYDAY: 
MAINE’S LOBSTERMEN NEED EXEMPTION  
FROM FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 
Michael L. O’Brien* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Portland, Maine, the summer of 2012 was one for the ages.  The 
weather was spectacular, Mumford & Sons graced the scenic Eastern 
Promenade with a legendary outdoor concert,1 and soft-shell lobster was 
available at downtown wharfs for historically low prices.  Everything 
was seemingly perfect—“the way life should be.” 
But along Maine’s rocky coast another storyline was unfolding: the 
immense and crippling financial struggles of Maine’s lobstermen.2  
Despite waking up before dawn, performing intense manual labor and 
braving the high seas day after day, many Maine lobstermen returned to 
the docks to sell their catch at the end of the day with little hope of 
making a legitimate profit.3  On certain days, some lobstermen were 
unable to cover even their basic fuel and bait costs.4  And the worst part 
of it all?  There was seemingly nothing lobstermen could do to better 
their circumstances due to a decades-old consent decree that has been in 
effect since before many of the current lobstermen were even born. 
This Comment will examine the alternatives available to Maine 
lobstermen as they attempt to execute their right to earn an honest living.  
Part II will discuss the history of the Maine lobster industry, with a focus 
on the dramatic events that unfolded in the 1950s, and reveal how history 
appears to be repeating itself.  Part III will identify the relevant federal 
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 1. See Patrick Doyle, Mumford & Sons Stomp through Maine at Summer Festival 
Kickoff, ROLLING STONE, Aug. 5, 2012, at 43.  
 2. See Katharine Q. Seelye, In Maine, More Lobsters Than They Know What to Do 
With,  N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2012, at A15. 
 3. Cf. id. 
 4. See id. 
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antitrust laws and explain how their application to the Maine lobstermen 
effectuates an absurd result.  Finally, Part IV will analyze the options 
available to Maine lobstermen to remedy this situation—including 
invalidation of the consent decree, avenues for exemption from federal 
antitrust violations (namely, the agricultural exemption), along with 
additional strategies that could be implemented for relief.  The vitality of 
Maine’s lobster industry is critically important to Maine’s economy, 
image, and lifestyle.  Therefore, governmental actors in Maine should 
answer this distress signal.   
II. THE MAINE LOBSTER INDUSTRY 
A. Early Historical Development 
Maine has an enduring lobstering tradition that has evolved over 
time due to inevitable changes in technology and demand.5  Throughout 
the 18th century, “lobstering was done by gathering [lobsters] by hand 
along the shoreline.  Lobstering as a trap fishery came into existence in 
Maine around 1850.  Today, Maine is the largest lobster-producing state 
in the nation.”6  Lobster demand greatly increased when other markets 
around the country, particularly New York and Boston, began gaining 
interest in the crustacean.7  By the 1930s, the modern-day lobster 
industry had started to develop.8  As the Gulf of Maine Research Institute 
explains: 
Local, land-based buyers [emerged] who served as the link 
between the harvesters and the public.  The buyer purchased 
lobsters from a harvester who in turn bought fuel, bait, and other 
gear from the buyer.  The local buyer then either sold the 
                                            
 5. However, despite these advancements, the operation of hauling traps has remained 
relatively constant over the last few generations.  See History of Lobster in Maine, MAINE 
LOBSTER COUNCIL, http://www.lobsterfrommaine.com/maine-lobster-history.aspx (last 
visited March 13, 2013) (“Modern lobster harvesters operate much like their predecessors 
did—hauling lobsters by hand in traps.  And, just as it was when the industry was in its 
infancy, lobstering in Maine is often a family affair—techniques and territories are 
passed from one generation to the next.  It’s a close-knit community of harvesters who 
take care of and watch out for each other.”) 
 6. LOBSTERS: LOBSTERING HISTORY, GULF OF MAINE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 
http://www.gma.org/lobsters/allaboutlobsters/lobsterhistory.html (last visited April 22, 
2013). 
 7. Id. 
 8. See id. 
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lobsters to people who came down to the docks or turned them 
over to a regional dealer who sent the lobsters out of state.9  
As the relationship between lobstermen and dealers solidified, a multi-
tiered distribution system developed that remains firmly in place today. 
B. The Great Lobster War of the 1950s 
Following World War II, the lobster industry boomed as “the cost of 
lobster outpaced inflation, increasing profits for lobstermen and thereby 
encouraging more people to join the industry.”10  With greater profits at 
stake, competition grew fierce up and down the Maine coast.  
Lobstermen began noticing a change in the market in the early 1950s, as 
the lobster supply grew larger, and prices subsequently dropped in the 
late summer months.11  In the summer of 1954, during a season 
containing back-to-back hurricanes, prices eventually dropped to an all-
time low.12  The lobster fishermen were extremely unhappy with the low 
prices and felt that middlemen were unfairly manipulating the market by 
communicating with one another about prices and wielding their 
advantageous bargaining position.13 
During this difficult financial era, a group of Maine lobstermen, led 
by Leslie H. Dyer of Vinalhaven, spearheaded the formation of a new 
statewide organization—the Maine Lobstermen’s Association (MLA).14  
Following its inception, the MLA issued a statement in the Portland 
Press Herald, announcing its purpose: “halt[ing] price-fixing by dealers 
so that lobster fishermen could make a livable income.”15  The MLA then 
held its first meeting to discuss collective opposition to the perceived 
unfair anticompetitive collusion by lobster dealers.16  Dyer was named 
the first MLA president by unanimous decision.17  Following his 
election, he summed up his view of Maine lobstermen, saying, “[w]e 
fishermen in Maine are as independent as a hog on ice, and just as 
                                            
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Philip Conkling, The Great Maine Lobster War, THE WORKING WATERFRONT 
(1993). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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helpless.  We’re more or less sot in our ways and we don’t like being 
dictated to.”18 
When prices fell again in the summer of 1955 (this time to 25-cents-
per-pound for soft-shell lobster), the MLA issued a press statement, 
directed at lobstermen, with a simple message: please abstain from 
hauling traps until prices rise to 30-cents-per-pound.19   This was the first 
public call for unified action.  The following year, in response to 
continued difficulties between lobstermen and dealers, the MLA 
established a minimum acceptable price for lobster:  35-cents-per-pound 
for soft-shell and 50-cents-per-pound for hard-shell.20  The organization 
declared this to be the minimum price that lobstermen could accept in 
order to continue making a living in the industry.21  Holding true to this 
conviction, when prices fell to 30-cents-per-pound in July 1956, 
lobstermen fishing out of Portland declared a strike until prices rose to 
the newly-established minimum price.22  Prices then fell along the entire 
Maine coast, and Dyer called for the first ever collective statewide strike 
in Maine’s lobstering history.23  After six long days off the water, prices 
returned to 35-cents-per-pound and the unified tie-up ended in success 
for the lobstermen.24 
In the summer of 1957, prices again sagged to 30-cents-per pound 
and Dyer issued yet another plea for a statewide strike, asking 
lobstermen to “stick together as we did [last summer] . . . [because we] 
are not unreasonable when we ask a small profit on our product.”25  This 
time around, however, the strike failed to gain the support of certain 
lobstermen who had been seeing success in their respective territories.26  
Dealers also became increasingly frustrated with the MLA’s tactics and 
began challenging the legitimacy of collective strikes.27  In response to 
this opposition, the MLA’s attorney informed the public that membership 
in the organization was voluntary and that requests to strike, even among 
                                            
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 57. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. (“For the first time in the history of lobster fishing, Dyer had achieved an 
astonishing show of cooperation among a large group of fishermen who then, like today, 
celebrate themselves as an archetype of the last American individualists.”).  
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id.  
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members, were indeed optional.28  Following unsuccessful efforts to 
garner support for a statewide strike in the summer of 1957, prices again 
dipped to 30-cents-per-pound, and tensions continued to rise within the 
industry.29  After taking notice of the tense circumstances, Maine’s 
Governor, Edmund Muskie, offered to mediate an agreement between 
the two sides.30  Hearing this, Dyer predicted to his fellow lobstermen 
that the Governor “will see to it that you boys get justice.”31  However, 
meetings between the two parties never came to fruition, and a noticeable 
divide formed between those lobstermen who continued to fish and those 
who tied up.32 
Eventually, most lobstermen returned to the water to haul out of 
“economic necessity,” according to Dyer.33  During this time, boiling 
tensions and financial pressures eventually led to the first act of 
violence—with shots fired in Tenants Harbor, Maine, at a pastor who 
also lobstered part-time.34  This outburst of violence changed the entire 
dynamic of the conflict. 
C. Federal Authorities Take Notice 
In 1957, as a result of the above-mentioned activity, federal 
authorities ordered a federal grand jury investigation into the price war 
that had been occurring along the Maine coast.35  Justice Department 
antitrust attorneys teamed with FBI agents for the investigation,36 and 
“[t]wo months later the grand jury, to the astonishment of everyone, 
returned price-fixing indictments not only against seven lobster dealers, 
but also against the [MLA] and its president Leslie Dyer.”37  Lobstermen 
were stunned by this announcement because, in their eyes, all they had 
been doing was attempting to make an honest living—and engaging in 
precisely the same practices that agricultural actors were legally 
                                            
 28. Id. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. at 58. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See id. (During this time, a lobsterman who continued to haul despite the proposed 
strike “warned that if any of his gear or boat were harmed, he’d ‘go through the 
Association and there wouldn’t be a buoy left in the whole ocean.’”). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 59. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
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engaging in under seemingly identical circumstances.38  A few Maine 
lawyers volunteered to represent Dyer and the MLA pro bono and began 
preparation for the trial that was set for May 1958 at the federal 
courthouse in downtown Portland.39 
The trial was a circus from the very beginning, with five lobstermen 
subpoenaed to testify against Dyer in an attempt to expose that they had 
been coerced into striking.40  These witnesses were incredibly 
uncooperative.41  At least one witness indicated on the stand that 
government lawyers had attempted to “brainwash” him during pre-trial 
preparations.42  Everyone who was forced to testify was adamant that no 
coercion had occurred.43  During his closing statement, the attorney for 
the MLA and Dyer argued that the Sherman Antitrust Act was being 
improperly applied to Maine lobstermen and “told the jurors that he 
could have paraded every one of the MLA’s 2600 members before them 
to look jurors in the eye and say, ‘As God is my witness, I have done no 
wrong.’”44  Despite the predominant feeling among those in attendance 
and those following the trial, the MLA and Dyer were found guilty of 
violating the Sherman Antitrust Act45 and ultimately received suspended 
penalties, after agreeing to sign a consent decree.46 
D. Consent Decree 
Dyer and the MLA agreed to sign a consent decree in order to avoid 
harsh punishments; and the decree announced a binding formal 
agreement among lobstermen to never again discuss price fixing or 
attempt a collective strike.47  Taking effect in August 1958, the consent 
                                            
 38. Id. (An editorial that was written and printed in the BANGOR DAILY NEWS stated 
“Maine lobstermen . . . are only seeking to keep pace with the high cost of living.  The 
latter in turn is caused in no small part by the government support of farm prices – the 
same government that is prosecuting the lobstermen.  Confused?  So are we.”). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 60. (“In all, the Government called 29 witnesses for the prosecution . . . 
[and] they were all in agreement on the fundamental point that neither Dyer nor anyone 
else had told them what to do during the strike.”). 
 44. Id. 
 45. U.S. v. Me. Lobsterman’s Ass’n, 160 F. Supp. 115 (D. Me. 1957). 
 46. Eric Russell, Are Lobstermen Keeping Their Traps Shut?, PORTLAND PRESS 
HERALD, July 14, 2012, at A4. 
 47. See Nicholas Walsh, The End of the Lobster Consent Decree?, FISHERMEN’S VOICE, 
Aug., 2012, available at http://fishermensvoice.com/archives/201208NicholasWalsh.html. 
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decree applied to every Maine lobsterman who had notice of the 
judgment (effectively every Maine lobsterman).48  The unprecedented 
charges instituted by the federal government during the 1950s have 
instilled fear in many Maine lobstermen, and caution them to discuss 
their displeasure over current prices.49  Over fifty years later, the decree 
resurfaces during economically challenging times.50 
E. Current Conditions for Maine Lobstermen 
History appears to be repeating itself.  The price of lobster has 
decreased significantly over recent years and frustrations are reaching a 
boiling point.  Many experts attribute the glut of lobsters to the warming 
of coastal waters.51  Marine biologists have documented rapidly rising 
temperatures in the gulf of Maine over the last dozen years, which 
directly affects when lobsters shed their shells and mate.52  Lobsters have 
been emerging earlier in the season in record numbers, thereby flooding 
the market and driving down prices during the late summer months.53  
Once again, it has become difficult to make a living in the lobster 
industry. 
As mentioned above, this difficulty does not stem from a lack of 
lobsters.  In 1987, Maine lobstermen hauled in less than 20 million 
pounds of product.54  This number has increased relatively steadily and 
culminated in a record 104 million pounds of lobster caught in 2011.55  
This record catch “brought the state $334 million, a coastal income 
second only to the tourism industry that lobsters help create.”56  As these 
figures suggest, the importance of the lobster industry to Maine’s 
economy cannot be understated.57  And although fisheries are struggling 
                                            
 48. Id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See Russell, supra note 46. 
 51. Joanne Omang, In Maine, a Crustacean Calamity, THE WASHINGTON POST, July 
20, 2012, at A12. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Russell, supra note 46. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Omang, supra note 51. 
 57. See STATE OF MAINE, DEPT. OF MARINE RESOURCES: PRELIMINARY 2012 LOBSTER 
LANDINGS SHOW AN INCREASE OF 18 PERCENT OVER 2011 WHILE VALUE DECLINES BY 
$3.7 MILLION, http://www.maine.gov/dmr/news/2013/2012LobsterLandings.htm (last 
visited April 11, 2013).  Commissioner Patrick Celia of the Maine Department of Marine 
Resources recently stated, “[w]e will be seeking input into the development of 
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all around the country, “Maine, which produces 80 percent of the 
nation’s lobster catch and depends more on fishing than most states, is 
especially hard hit.”58 
Over the past few years, prices have adapted to this dramatic 
increase in supply.59  Prices paid to lobstermen for their catch peaked at 
over $4.60 per pound in 2005.60  In 2012, many parts of the state saw 
prices fall to a forty-year low, plummeting below $1.50 per pound.61  
Increasing frustrations stem, in part, from the fact that, although lower 
prices are being paid to lobstermen on the wharfs, restaurants continue to 
price gouge because of an expectation that lobster is, or should be, 
expensive.62  For instance, a 2 1/2 pound steamed lobster (which a 
lobsterman likely sold off the boat for approximately $5.00) still fetched 
a whopping $49.00 in Portland’s Old Port district restaurants in 2012.63 
Lobstermen routinely place blame on the dealers for price gouging, 
and many lobstermen continuously remind dealers of their rising 
expenses.  Sound familiar?  “Gone are the days when a lobsterman 
worried about catching lobsters.  Enter the era of worrying if you will be 
paid enough to make ends meet.”64  Fuel prices have also risen 
substantially, nearly quadrupling over the past ten years.65  With the 
rising cost of fuel and the steady cost of bait, boat payments, and 
employing a sternman, making a profit is no guarantee.66  And with the 
consent decree still binding those with notice, modern-day lobstermen 
appear to be trapped in a dying industry. 
In the summer of 2012, desperate for relief, “several lobstermen’s 
associations asked the state Department of Marine Resources to 
                                                                                                  
management measures that respond to abundant supply and its adverse impact statewide 
on boat price, particularly in the summer months.” Id. 
 58. Abby Goodnough, In Maine, Tensions Over Ailing Lobster Industry, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 23, 2009, at A16. 
 59. Russell, supra note 46. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Patrick Doyle, Why Are Restaurant Lobsters Still So Expensive?, BOSTON 
MAGAZINE, Aug. 22, 2012. 
 62. See id. 
 63. DiMillo’s on the Water: Dinner Menu, available at http://www.dimillos.com/ 
restaurant/dinner.html. 
 64. Patrice McCarron, Steaming Ahead: August 2012, MLA NEWSLETTER, Aug. 2, 
2012, available at http://mlcalliance.org/2012/08/02/steaming-ahead-august-2012/. 
 65. See Richard H. Thaler, Why Gas Prices Are Out of Any President’s Control, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2012, at BU3 (“In February 2001, just after Mr. Bush took office, the 
average price of regular gasoline was $1.45 a gallon. By June 2008, that price had risen 
to $4.05”). 
 66. Omang, supra note 51. 
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temporarily close the fishery until rising demand brings back reasonable 
prices,” but this request for help was promptly refused.67  Patrick 
Keliher, the Commissioner for the Maine Department of Marine 
Resources, issued the following statement about low boat prices: 68 
The Department will not be closing the lobster fishery. Based on 
the concerns that have been raised by the industry, I have 
reviewed our statutory authorities and they do not allow us to 
shut down the fishery for economic reasons. We have heard that 
fisherman are seeking to impose a de facto shutdown of the 
fishery and coercing others into complying by threatening to cut 
off their gear.  The State will not tolerate any trap molestation, 
and any such actions will be met with targeted and swift 
enforcement or other appropriate action. Harvesters should also 
be aware that such actions may be in violation of federal antitrust 
laws.69 
Clearly, the “great lobster war” is still fresh in the minds of state 
officials.70  Despite the lack of help from state-level authorities, many 
local leaders of fishing communities are terribly concerned for the 
lobstermen and the uncertain future of the industry.71  Given the nature of 
the Maine lobstermen, it is unlikely that they will continue to suffer 
without taking some form of action.  Whether we are on the brink of the 
next “great lobster war,” however, remains to be seen. 
After explaining the history of the Maine lobster industry, the 
circumstances leading to the issuance of the 1958 consent decree, and the 
financial woes currently crippling the industry (along with the eerie 
feeling that history is repeating itself), this Comment will now analyze 
the biggest obstacle to relief for struggling Maine lobstermen: the federal 
antitrust laws. 
                                            
 67. Id. 
 68. The term “boat prices” refers to the prices lobstermen receive for their catch. 
 69. Jessica Brophy, Lobster Prices Still Depressed, PENOBSCOT BAY PRESS (July 12, 
2012), https://penobscotbaypress.com/news/2012/july/12/lobster-prices-still-depressed/#. 
Ujx7BCgui9Y (quoting Press Release Patrick Keliher, Comm’r Me. Dept. of Marine Res. 
(July 9, 2012) (on file with author)). 
 70. See id. 
 71. See id. 
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III. THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT OF 1890 
A. General Language and Applicability 
Federal law currently prohibits Maine lobstermen from speaking to 
one another about collectively tying up their boats (choosing, as a group, 
to abstain from hauling traps due to low prices) because doing so would 
constitute a concerted effort, which has been deemed a violation of 
federal antitrust laws.72  Therefore, absent reinterpretation of this now 
well-established principle, orchestrating a unified tie-up among Maine 
lobstermen (with all else constant) is not a viable option.  In relevant 
part, the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (Sherman Act) states: 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every 
person who shall make any contract or engage in any 
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be 
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be 
punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, 
or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not 
exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the 
discretion of the court.73 
However, questions loom as to whether the Sherman Act was 
designed to prevent the type of behavior that led to the issuance of the 
1958 consent decree.  “Unfortunately this same law that was used so 
successfully against robber barons of past centuries also applies to those 
who catch lobsters.”74  Under current interpretation of the Sherman Act, 
“[b]ecause each Maine lobsterman is an individual business, if a group of 
lobstermen act collectively and cease fishing for lobsters in order to force 
an increase in boat price, they can be accused of collusion and restraint 
of trade under the Act.”75  Even the Department of Justice has recognized 
a change in the Act’s scope over time.76  But should its scope include 
Maine lobstermen? 
                                            
 72. Russell, supra note 46. 
 73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2004). 
 74. Melissa Waterman, Tie-Ups and Anti-Trust Law: U.S. and Canadian Perspectives 
MLA NEWSLETTER June 2012, at 5. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Philip J. Weiser, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. Antitrust Div., Dept. of Justice, 
Address at the Organization for Competitive Markets 11th Annual Conference: Toward a 
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B. Application Leads to an “Absurd Result” 
The Sherman Act was enacted as a response to the emergence of 
powerful trusts, such as John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil trust, which 
had monopolized entire industries across the nation by implementing 
vertical integration tactics.77  A primary objective of the Act was to 
prevent abuse by powerful entities that were engaging in unfair business 
practices, thereby resulting in poor conditions for those with less 
power.78  Endorsing the passage of the Sherman Act, U.S. Representative 
Ezra B. Taylor spoke on the House floor about the powerful beef trust:  
The beef trust fixes arbitrarily the daily market price of cattle, 
from which there is no appeal, for there is no other market.  The 
farmers get from one-third to half of the former value of their 
cattle and yet beef is as costly as ever. . . . This monster robs the 
farmer on the one hand and the consumer on the other.79  
Therefore, the conditions that prompted demand for protection under the 
Sherman Act, it seems, are now being flipped to punish and restrict the 
very type of individuals that the legislation initially set out to protect.  
Lobstermen are receiving historically low prices at the docks, but lobster 
is as expensive as ever at the restaurants in town.  Middlemen are 
engaging in precisely the same type of behavior condemned by 
Representative Taylor during the legislative debates leading to the 
Sherman Act’s passage. 
As further evidence that middlemen, like those currently buying low 
and selling high at the wharfs in Maine, have historically been disfavored 
under the law, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed the content of Lord 
Hale’s treatise, De Portibus Maris, recalling: 
A man, for his own private advantage, may, in a port of town, set 
up a wharf or crane, and may take what rates he and his 
                                                                                                  
Competition Policy Agenda for Agriculture Markets (Aug. 7, 2009) (stating that 
“[c]onsequently, the law first created to address the trusts of the late 1800s now addresses 
effectively both traditional markets and the challenges to competition in our modern, high 
technology economy.”). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Gregory Werden, Monopsony and the Sherman Act: Consumer Welfare in a 
New Light, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 707, 714-15 (2007) (noting that “[i]n both houses of 
Congress, participants in debates often singled out the beef trust for condemnation, and 
they condemned it for reducing the prices paid to cattle farmers more than for raising 
prices to consumers”). 
 79. Weiser, supra note 76. 
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customers can agree for cranage, wharfage, housellage, pesage; 
for he doth no more than is lawful for any man to do, viz., makes 
the most of his own. . . . [However], there cannot be taken 
arbitrary and excessive duties for cranage, wharfage, pesage . . . 
neither can they be enhanced to an immoderate rate; but the 
duties must be reasonable and moderate . . . . For now the wharf 
and crane and other conveniences are affected with a public 
interest, and they cease to be juris privati only; as if a man set 
out a street in new building on his own land, it is now no longer 
bare private interest, but is affected by a public interest.80 
The Supreme Court, after calling into question these unreasonable rates, 
justified interference in the business affairs of wharf owners and the like, 
explaining that “[i]f they did not wish to submit themselves to such 
interference, they should not have clothed the public with an interest in 
their concerns.”81  Today, there is undoubtedly a public interest in the 
lobster industry’s success.82  Because lobstermen are forced to deal with 
these middlemen, the industry must be regulated to benefit the public 
interest, in a way that prevents unreasonable rates from being set by 
lobster dealers and middlemen.  The Sherman Act’s legislative record 
and the Supreme Court’s traditional approach to wharfing regulations 
justify asking whether the federal antitrust laws were intended to restrict 
Maine lobstermen the way they currently are.   
Applying the Sherman Act to Maine lobstermen leads to an absurd 
result.  Indeed, as the U.S. Supreme Court has proclaimed: “[i]t is a 
familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet 
not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the 
intention of its makers.”83  All laws should be construed “as not to lead to 
injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence.”84  Furthermore, the 
Court explains that “another guide to the meaning of a statute is found in 
the evil which it is designed to remedy; and for this the court properly 
looks at contemporaneous events, the situation as it existed, and as it was 
pressed upon the attention of the legislative body.”85  The Sherman Act 
was not initially intended to limit the bargaining power of Maine 
lobstermen.  Analyzing the evil that the legislature intended to remedy 
                                            
 80. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 150 (1876) (alteration in original) (citations 
omitted). 
 81. Id. at 133. 
 82. See, e.g. Omang, supra note 51. 
 83. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). 
 84. Id. at 461. 
 85. Id. at 463. 
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helps to illuminate logical exclusions from the Act’s penalties.86  
Because the legislation was intended to target those who unfairly 
dominated entire industries, including middlemen who set unreasonable 
prices, lobstermen (who fall victim to unreasonable price demands) seem 
to be a logical exception.  The question thus posed by the Court in 
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, applied to this set of facts, 
would be: whether, if those voting on the Sherman Act had known that 
the legislation would actually bolster the power of certain middlemen, 
thereby leading to the near collapse of the Maine lobster industry, “[c]an 
it be believed that it would have received a minute of approving thought 
or a single vote?”87 
Although not all judges agree that legislative history is an 
appropriate gauge of a statute’s meaning, the Court has explained that 
certain unique circumstances require the examination of congressional 
intent and purpose.88  Additionally, despite judicial preference for 
predictability and consistency, changing circumstances make the doctrine 
of stare decisis particularly vulnerable in the area of federal antitrust 
law.89  Indeed, 
in the area of antitrust law, there is a competing interest, well 
represented in this Court’s decisions, in recognizing and 
adapting to changed circumstances and the lessons of 
accumulated experience.  Thus, the general presumption that 
legislative changes should be left to Congress has less force with 
respect to the Sherman Act in light of the accepted view that 
Congress ‘expected the courts to give shape to the statute’s broad 
mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.’90 
Therefore, despite Maine lobstermen being deemed in violation of the 
Sherman Act in the 1950s, the U.S. Supreme Court “has reconsidered its 
decisions construing the Sherman Act when the theoretical 
underpinnings of those decisions are called into serious question.”91  The 
                                            
 86. Id. at 464. 
 87. Id. at 472. 
 88. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) (“Given 
this legislative history . . . [i]t would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation’s 
concern over centuries of racial injustice . . . constituted the first legislative prohibition of 
. . . efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy.”) (citation 
omitted). 
 89. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 21. 
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time has come to reconsider the Sherman Act as applied to Maine 
lobstermen. 
Although applying the Sherman Act to Maine lobstermen leads to an 
absurd result, the remainder of this Comment analyzes whether relief is 
available within the current legal framework, absent a court’s 
reinterpretation of existing law.  Typically,  
[e]conomics dictate that when the price for lobster goes too low, 
individuals stop fishing.  [But] [t]he reality is that Maine has a 
large and diverse group of individual lobstermen who have 
different economic breaking points.  The result has been 
deepening tensions between those who chose not to fish and 
those who continued with business as usual.92   
These are the same circumstances that led to the “great lobster war.”  
With the 1958 consent decree still looming, the industry is at a clear 
crossroads. 
IV. CAN MAINE LOBSTERMEN REMEDY THEIR DISMAL ECONOMIC 
SITUATION WITHOUT VIOLATING THE SHERMAN ACT? 
“In the United States it is generally illegal for businesses to collude 
in setting prices, or setting sales territories, or otherwise making 
arrangements to limit competition.”93  However, certain actors and 
industries are exempt from antitrust laws altogether.94  Additionally, 
some business entities have organized their affairs in a manner that 
exempts them from the normal reach of the laws.95   In addition, 
Canadian lobstermen, just north of the Maine border, are not faring as 
poorly as Maine lobstermen, even though the two markets are closely 
connected.96  So, what actions can be taken? 
There have been rumblings that “a lawyer acting for the [MLA] 
intends to file a motion to set aside the consent decree.”97  It remains 
unclear whether this is the best approach to help lobster prices rebound, 
as the motion will likely be dismissed.  Furthermore, a provision in the 
consent decree “prohibits the [MLA] from engaging in any sort of 
                                            
 92. McCarron, supra note 64. 
 93. Walsh, supra note 47. 
 94. See infra Part IV.A-B. 
 95. See infra Part IV.C. 
 96. See infra Part IV.D. 
 97. Walsh, supra note 47. 
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activity or advocacy that might affect the supply of live lobsters.”98   
Despite the rumor, it remains to be seen whether “the Maine lobster 
fishery, which surely has as much political clout as the dairy industry 
when it comes to getting laws on the books, [is] maneuvering for some 
sort of protection from the Sherman Act.”99   
The remainder of this Comment will explore the legal options 
potentially available to Maine lobstermen who wish to enhance their 
dismal financial prospects.  Throughout this exploratory process, Maine 
lobstermen must be willing to untie their moorings and enter uncharted 
waters.  The following options are not mutually exclusive, but instead 
provide a collection of avenues, which could work best if pursued in 
unison. 
A. State Action Exception 
Although the Sherman Act restrains individual actors from engaging 
or conspiring to engage in anticompetitive behavior, the U.S. Supreme 
Court, in Parker v. Brown, “established the principle that the [Sherman 
Act] did not restrain state action or official action directed by the 
state.”100  In this decision, the Court upheld the California Agricultural 
Prorate Act, which effectively limited competition and stabilized prices 
in order to support the economic health of the agricultural industry.101  
Vital to the Court’s decision was that California was acting 
independently in passing such legislation and was not a real party in 
interest to the new arrangement.102  The Court explained that “where a 
restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result of valid governmental 
action, as opposed to private action, no violation of the Act can be made 
out,”103 thus recognizing that state governments may engage in 
competition restriction when doing so will benefit the public.104 
Based on this case law, the Maine legislature could take action to 
support the economic health of the lobster industry, while avoiding the 
                                            
 98. Bill Trotter, Maine Lobsterman’s Association Says 54-year-old Consent Decree Doesn’t 
Work Anymore, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.bangordailynews. 
com/2012/03/20/business/maine-lobstermens-association-says-54-year-old-consent-decree-
doesnt-work-anymore/. 
 99. Walsh, supra note 47. 
 100. FED. CONTROL OF BUS. § 33, “State action; Lobbying” (July 2012) [hereinafter § 
33]. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 998 F.2d 1073, 1076 (1st Cir. 1993). 
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penalties that threaten individual fishermen.105  Such a move would 
address the concerns of citizens who hold a crucial role in Maine’s 
economy.106  State action is a legally sound mechanism available to 
ensure that an industry, the success of which is an important public 
interest, does not collapse.  Additionally, in Asheville Tobacco Board of 
Trade, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, despite declaring state action 
inapplicable, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
[w]hen a state has a public policy against free competition in an 
industry important to it, the state may regulate that industry in 
order to control or, in a proper case, to eliminate competition 
therein.  It may even permit persons subject to such control to 
participate in the regulation, provided independent state officials 
adequately supervise their activities.107 
Accordingly, the Maine legislature may presumably act to protect the 
lobster industry by passing legislation that grants lobstermen an 
exemption from federal antitrust laws.108  State officials would then be 
required to monitor subsequent activities, or delegate this oversight 
power to local communities and municipalities.109 
Furthermore, the language in the consent decree that “prohibits the 
[MLA] from engaging in any sort of activity or advocacy that might 
affect the supply of live lobsters,”110 raises serious constitutional 
concerns by unduly restricting lobstermen’s core First Amendment right 
to petition the government in order to redress their grievances.111  
Because restrictions on political speech are historically subjected to the 
strictest form of scrutiny, the consent decree may be facially 
unconstitutional.112  Lobsterman may therefore be able to lawfully 
                                            
 105. However, despite this clear language, certain courts have held that the exemption 
of states from federal antitrust law is “not as broad as the language would suggest.”  Id. 
(quoting E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 
(1961)). 
 106. See Omang, supra note 51. 
 107. Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 263 F.2d 502, 509 (4th 
Cir. 1959). 
 108. See infra Part IV.B. 
 109. See Tri-State Rubbish, 998 F.2d at 1079 (“[M]unicipal supervision of private 
actors is adequate where authorized by or implicit in the state legislation.”). 
 110. Trotter, supra note 98. 
 111. See E. R. R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 
137-38 (1961). 
 112. See U.S. CONST. amend. I;  see also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) 
(“[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] 
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”). 
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influence the state legislature to act on their behalf.  This constitutional 
right was reaffirmed in United Mine Workers v. Pennington, when the 
Court stated: 
[Prior case law] shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort 
to influence public officials regardless of intent or purpose. . . .  
Joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the 
antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition.  
Such conduct is not illegal, either standing alone or as part of a 
broader scheme itself violative of the Sherman Act.113 
Based on this language, collective lobbying efforts should not violate the 
Sherman Act. 
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,114 
however, established a “sham exception,” which declared 
anticompetitive lobbying efforts conducted in bad faith to be in violation 
of federal antitrust laws.115  Therefore, despite the legitimacy of their 
economic concerns and their constitutional right to redress grievances, 
Maine lobstermen must be careful when crafting their lobbying efforts to 
ensure that they are not deemed to fall within this “sham exception.”  
When facing the harsh punishments prescribed by the federal antitrust 
laws, there is no room for a trial and error approach.116  Thankfully (and 
unfortunately, as well), their grievances are no sham.  Despite the 
continued development of case law involving state-sponsored 
anticompetitive behavior,117 the state action immunity exemption has 
been firmly established in Maine, with courts explaining the existence of 
a doctrine under which state “government action may be anticompetitive 
. . . [or] unfair without being illegal.”118  Therefore, it seems that any 
                                            
 113. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965). 
 114. 365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
 115. Id. 
 116. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (describing the penalties for violating the antitrust laws). 
 117. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790-91 (1975) (“The 
threshold inquiry in determining if an anticompetitive activity is state action of the type 
the Sherman Act was not meant to proscribe is whether the activity is required by the 
State acting as sovereign. . . . It is not enough that . . . anticompetitive conduct is 
‘prompted’ by state action . . . .”); see also Fisherman’s Best, Inc. v. Recreational Fishing 
Alliance, 310 F.3d 183, 191 (4th Cir. 2002) (“The scope of this [Noerr Doctrine] 
immunity [which provides immunity to those who petition the government for redress], 
depends on the source, context, and nature of the anticompetitive restraint at issue.”). 
 118. Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt., Inc, 998 F.2d 1073, 1082 (1st Cir. 1993); 
see also Sandy River Nursing Care v. Aetna Casualty, 985 F.2d 1138, 1139, 1143-44, 
1147-48 (1st Cir. 1993). 
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potential legal claims by restaurants or middlemen resting on allegations 
of unfair governmental intrusion and the promotion of anticompetitive 
behavior would be moot. 
Although for nearly sixty years the consent decree has led 
lobstermen to believe that they are unable to take formal action to 
remedy their financial condition, legitimate lobbying of the state 
legislature remains a viable and constitutionally protected option.  Of 
course, the next logical question arises: for what exactly should Maine 
lobstermen be lobbying? 
The Maine legislature currently recognizes that the industry needs 
assistance, but seems misguided in its timid attempts to help.119  
Legislative efforts that fall short of utilizing state action to exempt 
lobstermen from antitrust violations have done nothing more than 
provide false hope.  During a legislative attempt to raise licensing fees, in 
order to generate revenue for marketing schemes, which would 
theoretically drive prices upward, “[the] co-chairman of the legislature’s 
Marine Resources Committee [said] ‘Maine’s blueberry, potato and dairy 
industries spend a far larger percentage of their revenues on marketing 
than lobster does.’”120  This language indicates that the Maine lobster 
industry lacks adequate marketing resources and, more importantly, 
implicitly suggests that Maine lobstermen are considered agricultural 
players.  Indeed, the state legislature appears to view the lobster 
fishermen as farmers, equating them to other agricultural actors.121  The 
similarities between Maine farmers and Maine lobstermen are too glaring 
to ignore.  Because comparisons between farmers and lobstermen are 
logical and easily supported, this analogy provides the best evidence that 
may be used to convince the legislature to grant an agricultural 
exemption to the lobster industry. 
                                            
 119. See Clarke Canfield, After Summer Glut, Maine Mulls Helping Lobster Biz, AP: 
THE BIG STORY (Feb. 28, 2013), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/maine-bills-aim-boost-
lobster-industry.  
 120. Id. 
 121. See id. 
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B. Agricultural Exemption 
1. Historical Backdrop 
Not every industry is bound by the same antitrust laws that currently 
plague Maine lobstermen.122  Beginning in the last decade of the 
nineteenth century, members of the agricultural industry convinced state 
legislatures that an exemption from federal antitrust laws was necessary 
because of vulnerability stemming from decreased bargaining power 
resulting from the highly perishable nature of the industry’s product, the 
difficulty in storing and transporting products in an efficient manner, and 
the subsequent reliance on a limited number of dealers, processors, and 
other middlemen.123  Because middlemen could threaten to avoid 
purchasing the product altogether, thereby leaving the farmer with a 
spoiled (and therefore valueless) product, producers in the agricultural 
industry were operating from a severely handicapped bargaining 
position.124  The buyers, in turn, often abused their bargaining position to 
drive down prices.125  Despite this, agricultural producers, namely rural 
farmers, were often unable to legally organize to remedy this situation 
due to the existing antitrust laws.126  In response, state legislatures began 
passing laws to help equal the playing field.127  Many of these new laws, 
however, were challenged as violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection guarantees and were ultimately declared 
unconstitutional.128 
2. Acts of United States Congress 
Congress responded to the injustice that led many state legislatures 
to shield farmers from antitrust violations by passing Section 6 of the 
Clayton Act,129 thereby excluding certain farmers from antitrust 
                                            
 122. See David L. Baumer et al., Curdling the Competition: An Economic and Legal 
Analysis of the Antitrust Exemption for Agriculture, 31 VILL. L. REV. 183, 185-86 (1986). 
 123. Id. at 186-88. 
 124. Id. at 187. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 188. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See, e.g., Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902); In re Grice, 79 
F. 627 (N.D. Tex. 1897); Georgia Fruit Exchange v. Turnipseed, 9 Ala. App. 123 (1913); 
Ford v. Chicago Milk Shippers’ Ass’n, 155 Ill. 166 (1895); Reeves v. Decorah Farmer’s 
Cooperative Soc’y, 160 Iowa 194 (1913). 
 129. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982). 
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prosecution and “free[ing them] from some of the limitations imposed by 
antitrust laws.”130  In response to criticism that these early efforts to 
provide relief to farmers were too vague and difficult to navigate, 
Congress passed the Capper-Volstead Act,131 officially carving out an 
agricultural exemption to the existing laws.132  The relevant portion of 
the Capper-Volstead Act provides: 
Persons engaged in the production of agricultural products as 
farmers, planters, ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers may 
act together in associations, corporate or otherwise, with or 
without capital stock, in collectively processing, preparing for 
market, handling, and marketing in interstate and foreign 
commerce, such products of persons so engaged. Such 
associations may have marketing agencies in common; and such 
associations and their members may make the necessary 
contracts and agreements to affect such purposes . . .133 
Additional legislative action has since been taken to ensure that 
agricultural actors are protected from their inherent vulnerabilities.  For 
instance, “[t]he Agricultural Fair Practices laws enacted on both the state 
and federal levels provide inducements for producers to gain market 
strength through group action.”134 
To be sure, Maine lobstermen consider themselves farmers under the 
definition that has been adopted by federal courts.135  Lobstermen 
cultivate the sea, and not simply in the metaphorical sense.  In Maine, 
each trap is filled with bait for all lobsters to feed, while laws permit only 
a select few lobsters to be kept and sold.136  For instance, current laws 
mandate that young lobsters, female egg-bearing lobsters, and large male 
                                            
 130. William E. Peters, Agricultural Cooperatives and the Antitrust Laws, 43 NEB. L. 
REV. 73, 74 (1963). 
 131. 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292 (1958). 
 132. Peters, supra note 130, at 77. 
 133. 7 U.S.C. §§ 291 (1958). 
 134. Donald A. Frederick, Legal Rights of Producers to Collectively Negotiate, 19 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 433, 436 (1993). 
 135. “A farmer is defined as one ‘engaged in agricultural pursuits as a livelihood or 
business.’”  Id., at 434 n. 2 (quoting Skinner v. Dingwell, 134 F.2d 391, 393 (8th Cir. 
1943)). 
 136. See, e.g., Bill Trotter, After Five Years, Maine Lobster Fishery Nears 
Sustainability Certification, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Jan. 12, 2013 (“Unlike neighboring 
states and Canadian provinces, Maine long has maintained minimum and maximum catch 
sizes. For generations, Maine lobstermen also have cut small V-notch marks in the tails 
of egg-producing females and returned them to the water to ensure a future supply.”). 
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lobsters that have been successful breeders must immediately be released 
back into the wild.137  Through these practices, lobstermen are nurturing 
future harvests.  Importantly, these laws are not an attempt to appear 
“agricultural,” as the first statutes banning the possession of egg-bearing 
female lobsters and regulating the minimum size of an acceptable catch 
were codified in 1872 and 1874, respectively, and these practices were 
already widely embraced by many Maine lobstermen at the time of their 
enactment.138 
Given these sustainability practices, lobstermen should be able to 
receive the same protection as other agricultural actors.  As further proof 
that the Maine lobstermen are actually harvesting their supply and 
“farming” the sea, as opposed to depleting marine resources, the Maine 
lobster industry was certified as sustainable in 2013, a distinctive badge 
of honor, by the Marine Stewardship Council, an international 
organization.139  Following the announcement of this honor, Maine’s 
Governor, Paul LePage, commented on the unique nature of the Maine 
lobster industry, explaining that “[t]his certification recognizes our 
longstanding practices of good stewardship and ensures that every 
lobster caught in Maine waters can be marketed not only as delicious, 
healthy food, but also as a resource that meets the most stringent 
international environmental standard for seafood sustainability.”140 
3. Exemption Merely Levels the Playing Field 
Exemption from federal antitrust laws does not grant an industry 
permission to abuse its newly enhanced bargaining position.  Illustrative 
of this, a U.S. Supreme Court case, Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers 
Ass’n v. United States, involved an “antitrust action . . . against an 
agricultural co-operative [marketing association composed of about] 
2,000 dairy farmers of Maryland and Virginia that supplies 
approximately eighty-six percent of the milk purchased by all milk 
                                            
 137. Clarke Canfield, Maine Lobster Fishery Certified as Sustainable, ABC NEWS, 
Mar. 10, 2013, http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/maine-lobster-fishery-certified-
sustainable-18697249. 
 138. See Lobster Institute, Lobstering Basics – History, UNIV. OF ME., 
http://umaine.edu/lobsterinstitute/education/lobstering-basics/history/ (last visited Apr. 
21, 2013). 
 139. Canfield, supra note 137. 
 140. Jessica Hall, Maine Lobster Gets ‘Seal of Approval,’ PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, 
Mar. 11, 2013, www.pressherald.com/news/maine-lobster-gets-seal-of-approval_2013-
03-11.html. 
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dealers in the Washington, D. C., metropolitan area.”141  The Court held 
that “[t]he privilege the Capper-Volstead Act grants producers to conduct 
their affairs collectively does not include a privilege to combine with 
competitors so as to use a monopoly position as a lever further to 
suppress competition by and among independent producers and 
processors.”142 
To avoid this potential issue, exempted industries need to be careful 
about how they set prices.  For example, the “[Maine Milk] Commission 
establishes minimum milk prices, monthly, for milk sold in gallons,” 
which is “based on the Market Administrator’s price announcements; 
however, the Commission has the authority to add special premiums to 
the price based on market conditions in southern New England.”143  If 
exempted, the Maine lobstermen could establish a similar commission to 
mandate minimum lobster prices, much like the MLA did in the 1950s.  
Permitting the establishment of a commission designed to set minimum 
prices for live lobster sales in Maine, based on the model provided by the 
dairy farmers and the Maine Milk Commission, would likely save the 
industry.144 
4. Vulnerability of Farmers Widely Recognized 
The federal laws that granted an agricultural exemption “were 
preceded by many state laws with similar content and objectives—
namely to authorize the existence of agricultural cooperatives and to 
exempt them from antitrust liability.”145  Farmers have been considered 
particularly vulnerable, because 
the generally high perishability of agricultural products, the 
technological inability to store them for very long, and the 
                                            
 141. Md. & Va. Milk Producers Ass’n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 460 (1960). 
 142. Id. at 472. 
   143. How Prices are Established, MAINE.GOV, 
http://www.maine.gov/dacf/about/boards/milk_commission/established.shtml (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2013); see also 7 M.R.S.A. § 2954(1), (2) (2012). 
 144. Typically, “‘[w]hen horizontal price-fixing causes buyers to pay more . . . than the 
price that would prevail in a market free of the unlawful trade restraint, antitrust injury 
occurs.’”  Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc. v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 262, 272 
(2003) (quoting Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 
2000)).  An exemption, however, provides an avenue to set prices in a lawful manner. 
 145. Arie Reiche, The Agricultural Exemption in Antitrust Law: A Comparative Look 
at the Political Economy of Market Regulation, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 843, 846 (2006) (citing 
A. Ladru Jensen, The Bill of Rights of U.S. Cooperative Agriculture, 20 ROCKY MTN. 
MIN. L. INST. 181, 191 n.29 (1948)). 
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absence of efficient transportation left many individual farmers 
dependent on one or a few handlers (processors and distributors). 
On many occasions, the middlemen abused this power. In an 
effort to force down prices, the middlemen could simple (sic.) 
threaten not to buy; the prospect of rotten vegetables or spoiled 
milk was often enough to make the farmer capitulate. In the 
dairy industry, where individual farmers were dependent on 
handlers for weighing milk to specify its volume and for testing 
its butterfat content, short-changing was a common practice.146 
Given the glaring similarities between the struggles that led to the 
creation of an agricultural exemption and the current conditions facing 
Maine’s lobstermen, especially given the internationally-recognized 
sustainability practices mandated by law and the important role the 
industry plays in Maine’s overall economic health, it is unclear why 
Maine lobstermen would not be granted the same protection given to 
other agricultural actors.  The circumstances initially leading to the 
agricultural exemption are markedly similar to the conditions currently 
facing the lobster industry and, therefore, should be legally recognized as 
such.147 
C. Formation of Cooperatives 
Participation in cooperatives is another avenue towards avoiding 
liability under the Sherman Act because the Fisheries Cooperative & 
Management Act of 1934148 “gives anti-trust immunity to harvesters 
organized as a cooperative . . . [as it] treats a cooperative of individual 
harvesters as a single entity.”149  However, “if two or more cooperatives . 
. . were to join forces to push the price of lobster up, such action would 
contravene Section 1 of the Act, which prohibits such restraints of 
trade.”150  Cooperative members are only immune from price fixing 
within and amongst its membership.151  This, of course, is not true if a 
broad agricultural exemption has been granted.152 
                                            
 146. Id. (quoting Baumer, supra note 122, at 187). 
 147. See Baumer, supra note 122, at 186-187. 
 148. 15 U.S.C. § 521 (1934). 
 149. Waterman, supra note 74, at 5. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Reiche, supra note 145, at 846; see, e.g., Ford v. Chi. Milk Shippers’ Ass’n, 39 
N.E. 651 (Ill. 1895); Reeves v. Decorah Farmers’ Coop. Soc’y, 140 N.W. 844 (Iowa 
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168 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:1 
 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has limited the scope of the exemption 
granted pursuant to the Capper-Volstead Act to “the formation of 
cooperatives and did not extend it to their anticompetitive activities, such 
as combining with competitors that are not exempt cooperatives or using 
their dominant position to suppress competition with independent 
producers and processors.”153  Again, this exemption does not signify 
unfettered freedom to conduct business in any manner that a cooperative 
chooses.  The Capper-Volstead Act 
charge[s] the Secretary of Agriculture with the responsibility of 
taking action if he believe[s] that any such association 
“monopolizes or restrains trade . . . to such an extent that the 
price of any agricultural product is unduly enhanced.”  In such 
cases, a decree can be issued against the association that requires 
it to cease and desist from such acts.154  
This potential for liability can be remedied through mergers and the 
formation of larger entities.155  For instance, the dairy industry was able 
to unify on a very large scale, with “literally hundreds of cooperative 
mergers in the [1960s] and [1970s] yield[ing] several large regional 
cooperatives.”156  The lobster industry is already beginning to follow this 
model—with cooperatives forming in certain regional areas.157  Each 
individual lobsterman, under current law, represents an independent 
business entity; therefore, unless situated as a member of a cooperative, 
lobstermen are prohibited by the Sherman Act from price coordination.158  
“Members of a [cooperative] are exempt from [antitrust] laws, which 
means they are allowed to talk about coordinating actions with other co-
op fishermen.”159  Thus, formation of large-scale cooperatives may be a 
logical starting point. 
Under “Section 1 of the Capper-Volstead Act . . . any person who 
thus qualified as a ‘farmer’ would be immune from the antitrust laws 
only to the extent that his activities stemmed from his farming operation 
and were conducted under the auspices of a qualified cooperative.”160  
This principle is now well established, and federal judges have 
                                            
 153. Reiche, supra note 145, at 848 (quoting Md. & Va. Milk Producers Ass’n v. 
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consequently dismissed challenges to it in “terse one-page opinion[s].”161  
“Relying upon Section 6 of the Clayton Act [a federal judge stated], ‘[i]t 
seems to me when Congress said that cooperatives were not to be 
punished, even though . . . monopolistic, it would be as ill-considered for 
me to hold to the contrary as were some of the early labor decisions.’”162  
But how realistic is it for the entire Maine lobster fishery to combine 
under the umbrella of a few cooperatives?  Given the territorial, 
independent and occasionally hostile nature of certain individuals within 
the industry, is such cooperation even possible?163   
In order to preserve the industry and better their financial outlook, 
lobstermen may have no choice but to unite.  However, the extent to 
which cooperatives are necessary in the long-term depends largely on 
whether or not a blanket agricultural exemption can be attained. 
D. Canadian Approach 
The above-mentioned options do not represent an exhaustive list of 
the different alternatives available to remedy this situation.  Other 
nations have found different ways to address similar circumstances.  For 
instance, despite the similarities between American and Canadian 
antitrust doctrine, Canadian authorities have never targeted fish 
harvesters, as the harvesters are viewed as an unusual kind of a hybrid 
                                            
 161. Id. at 99. 
 162. Id. (quoting United States v. Dairy Co-op. Ass’n, 49 F. Supp. 475, 475 (D. Ore. 
1943)). 
 163. For a detailed illustration of the animosity existing among Maine lobstermen, see 
Clarke Canfield, Lobster Wars Turn Violent in Maine, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 4, 
2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/09/04/lobster-wars-turn-
violent_n_277748.html (“Lobster fishermen have feuded for generations over who can 
set traps, and where.  To protect their fishing grounds, the lobstermen here have been 
known to cut trap lines, circle their boats menacingly around unwelcome vessels and fire 
warning blasts from shotguns.  With lobster prices down, the animosity has been 
particularly shrill this summer.”).  See also AP, Barrage of Sabotage Hits Maine 
Lobstermen, CBS NEWS (May 11, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-
57432430/barrage-of-sabotage-hits-maine-lobstermen/ (“Two lobster boats were recently 
sunk by vandals in Friendship. The dispute among tight-lipped lobstermen points to the 
unwritten laws of the sea: fishermen mete out justice themselves, sometimes with violent 
results.”); Goodnough, supra note 58 (“[U]nofficially, each harbor has its own 
boundaries, determined by local lobstermen over the decades.  Newcomers often find 
their buoys snatched or their trap lines cut. The lobstermen who live on Maine’s rugged 
islands are especially territorial and known for practicing frontier justice; in one notorious 
case in 2000, two lobstermen fought over turf with a pitchfork and a fish gaff.”). 
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business entity.164  Canadian lobstermen have never been subjected to 
punishment for price-fixing, remaining outside of federal prosecutors’ 
crosshairs.165  Additionally, in Prince Edward Island, the government has 
actually agreed to buy all of the surplus canners (lobsters less than one 
pound, which are illegal to keep in Maine due to the sustainability 
practices mandating strict minimum and maximum length requirements).  
The Canadian government also funds a four million dollar marketing 
campaign to help promote the fisheries, while providing other benefits 
such as enhanced employment insurance for lobstermen.166 
In addition to a hands-off prosecutorial approach and active 
government subsidization, Canada is home to many lobster processing 
plants, which Maine lacks.  Canadian plants process more than half of 
Maine’s annual lobster catch.  Maine has only three processing plants, 
while Canada has thirty-two.167  Maine’s lobster industry would benefit 
from having its product processed locally.168  The lack of in-state 
processing plants increases the need for transportation and further 
exacerbates the reliance on the middlemen who have access to the 
necessary storage facilities.  Building local processing plants would 
reduce the reliance on dealers and middlemen, thereby helping the local 
economy and taking advantage of interest in local food movements. 
If the legal changes discussed above cannot ultimately be realized, 
these alternative practical steps can be taken to help the industry revive 
itself.  Gaining domestic independence over the processing of Maine 
lobsters and improving the marketing scheme to better advertise the 
local, wild-caught, sustainable character of this unique fishery would be 
a step in the right direction. 
                                            
 164. Waterman, supra note 74. 
 165. Id. 
 166. P.E.I. to Buy Lobster in 5-Point Plan for Industry, CBC NEWS (May 14, 2009), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/prince-edward-island/p-e-i-to-buy-lobster-in-5-point-
plan-for-industry-1.832268. 
 167. Ramona Du Houx, Canadian Lobster Price Protests Highlight a “Serious Economic 
Flaw” in State’s Economy, MAINE INSIGHTS (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.maineinsights.com/ 
perma/canadian-lobster-price-protests-higlight-a-serious-economic-flaw-in-states-economy. 
 168. See Antonio Bussone, Lobster Processing Is Missing Link for Maine, BANGOR 
DAILY NEWS (Jan. 13, 2012), http://bangordailynews.com/2012/01/13/ 
opinion/contributors/lobster-processing-is-missing-link-for-maine (“Despite record 
catches, Maine’s lobster industry is in danger because it lacks an essential element of a 
strong natural resources economy — the local processing of the product and the financial 
benefit to the local economy.”). 
2013] Mayday, Mayday 171 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Given the Maine lobster industry’s importance to the state’s tourism 
industry and overall economic vitality, state action should be taken to 
ensure that lobstering in the Gulf of Maine remains economically 
feasible.  Nearly sixty years after the “great lobster war” of the 1950s, 
history appears to be repeating itself.  Frustrations over unfair prices are 
causing tension and foreshadowing a de facto shut down.  However, a 
unified tie-up would be viewed as a violation of the consent decree and 
would likely be met with harsh antitrust penalties, unless the state 
legislature grants protection. 
The legislative record leading to enactment of the Sherman Act and 
to the creation of an agricultural exemption applies precisely to the 
difficulties faced by Maine lobstermen, who currently operate at the 
mercy of powerful middlemen.  It seems absurd that these statutes, which 
were designed to protect individuals suffering from an unequal 
bargaining position and to provide relief in the form of fair prices for 
farmers and consumers, while limiting the unnatural stranglehold that 
middlemen have on a given market, are now being used against those 
who desperately need their protection. 
What is the solution?  First and foremost, the consent decree, which 
on its face raises serious First Amendment concerns, must be invalidated, 
so that an open discussion can take place in the capitol without fear of 
repercussion.   The state should then employ its state action exemption 
power to act on behalf of the industry, granting immunity to those simply 
looking to earn an honest living.  Expansion of the agricultural 
exemption to Maine lobstermen is not a strained and tenuous exercise.  
Recent designation as a certified sustainable fishery turns the analogy 
between lobstermen and farmers into a reality.  In order to organize and 
effectively communicate, Maine lobstermen would be wise to join 
cooperatives, which could then ultimately merge into a larger umbrella 
organization.  This structure would provide additional protection from 
potential antitrust violations during the formative phases of the industry’s 
transformation.  Finally, even if an exemption is granted and 
reorganization into cooperatives is achieved, the Maine lobster industry 
would be wise to build local processing plants and increase its marketing 
efforts, instead of remaining dependent on Canada for these services. 
A tangible injustice is currently occurring at Maine’s docks and 
wharfs, and the time has come for meaningful change.  Up and down the 
Maine coast, individuals within the industry are struggling to stay afloat 
and earn an honest living.  The lobster industry is again at a crossroads 
172 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:1 
 
 
and the state should take swift action to ensure that the iconic images of 
Maine’s coastline do not become a relic of yonder years. 
